The United States’s policy on landmines might be about to change

Then again, it may not.  There is a buzz around Washington and all signs point to an imminent announcement on the Obama Administration’s review of the current landmine policy which was put into place 10 years ago this month.  At one time, the United States was the undisputed leader in the movement to ban anti-personnel landmines.  In 1992, thanks to the leadership of Senator Patrick Leahy, the United States passed the first ever export  ban on landmines. In 1994, President Bill Clinton was one of, if not the first head of state to call for a permanent end to the use of landmines when he made the following statement at the United Nations General Assembly:

And today I am proposing a first step toward the eventual elimination of a less visible but still deadly threat: the world’s 85 million antipersonnel land mines, one for every 50 people on the face of the Earth. I ask all nations to join with us and conclude an agreement to reduce the number and availability of those mines. Ridding the world of those often hidden weapons will help to save the lives of tens of thousands of men and women and innocent children in the years to come.

In 1995, Belgium and Norway banned the use, production, trade and stockpiling of landmines and at that point, US leadership on the landmine issue began to slip.   While the US was instrumental in writing and passing the Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons which restricted the use of some types of landmines, the US did not sign the Ottawa or Mine Ban Treaty which was signed by 89 countries in 1997 and has been ratified or acceded to by 161 nations to date.  In 1998, the United States announced it would join the Ottawa Treaty in 2006 if a “suitable alternative” to anti-personnel landmines could be developed.  The current 2004 landmine policy issued by the George W. Bush administration did not pledge to join the Ottawa Treaty at any point.

In a recent piece, the Arms Control Association notes that the United States is the only member of NATO and with the exception of Cuba, the only country in the Western Hemisphere to not be a party to the Ottawa Treaty.  Last November, the United States Campaign to Ban Landmines issued a press release noting that 16,000 people have been killed or injured by landmines since the Obama Administration launched its policy review. Let me go one further on both of these points.  If the US were to sign the Ottawa Treaty, it is likely that others, specifically Georgia and Cuba, will follow suit.  Georgia and Cuba both maintain landmine stockpiles due to the US’s insistence that they might be necessary; if the US no longer feels that landmines might be necessary, then the arguments of Georgia and Cuba to keep them disappears.  Other countries’ arguments may similarly collapse if the US were to join the Ottawa Treaty.

As for the count of 16,000 landmine casualties since the start of the Obama Administration policy review, think about this: in 1992 the United States first recognized the humanitarian threat of landmines and responded by banning their export.  In those 22 years, an estimated 230,000 people were killed or injured by landmines.  That’s more than the combined casualties for Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Atomic Archive; Yale Law School).  One of President Obama’s ambitions is to rid the world of nuclear weapons.  Perhaps he should first finish the work started more than two decades ago and help eliminate the weapon that’s caused more casualties than all atomic and nuclear weapons.

Michael P. Moore

February 10, 2014


Interview with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Givhan

Over the last couple of weeks, I’ve had the privilege to engage in an extended email question and answer session with the US State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Plans, Programs and Operations, Maj. General Walter D. Givhan (Biography from State Department).  General Givhan oversees the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM / WRA), among other assignments, within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM).   As such, General Givhan is responsible for the US Humanitarian Mine Action Program and the Conventional Weapons Destruction Program and implements the current US Landmine Policy (State Department).

General Givhan took the opportunity to bring up the work done by PM / WRA on protecting civilians from the dangers of aging ammunition depots and combatting the proliferation of man-portable air-defense systems.  He also offered some insight into the State Department’s perspectives on the Mine Ban Treaty (referred to below as “the Ottawa Treaty”) and negotiations surrounding anti-vehicle mines and cluster munitions within the context of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).

I was interested to hear how political events in Guinea-Bissau (a coup in April of this year) and Sudan (expulsion of humanitarian deminers) had affected the State Department’s priorities and on the demining work being done in those countries.  I was also pleased to hear that General Givhan and PM are active to protect the funding made available for humanitarian demining from the budget fights on Capitol Hill.

I do worry that the consolidation of humanitarian mine action into the broader Conventional Weapons Destruction program could lead to reduced support for mine action in the future.  I absolutely support the elimination of ammunition depots from populated areas because of the tremendous risk they pose, risks made evident from recent explosions in Brazzaville (BBC News), Lagos (Guardian) and Maputo  (Metro).  However, in Libya, the US government prioritized securing MANPADS over landmines and while some of the funds made available for MANPADS destruction also covered landmine destruction and removal, the intent was to eliminate the MANPADS.  This is understandable from a national security and national interests perspective: the United States is not going to be threatened by landmines in the ground in Libya, but US airplanes flying in Libyan airspace could be targeted by MANPADS in Libya.  However, the humanitarian impact of MANPADS is dwarfed by that of landmines and this blog is based on the idea that the humanitarian impact should trump the national security argument.  Compare if you will the following: since 1975, MANPADS have been responsible for more than 800 civilian deaths (State Department); in 2012 alone landmines were responsible for more.

My thanks go to David I. McKeeby in PM’s Office of Congressional & Public Affairs for his help facilitating these exchanges.

Landmines in Africa: In 2011, the US funded mine clearance programs in Angola, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan; how does the State Department choose which countries to support humanitarian mine action programs?

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Walter Givhan: The purpose of humanitarian mine action is to protect victims of conflict and to restore access to land and infrastructure for internally displaced persons and for returning refugees in post-conflict situations.  Humanitarian Mine Action is a necessary precursor for economic development activities and for humanitarian relief.  With this purpose, the Department of State chooses to support requests for Conventional Weapons Destruction assistance, including humanitarian mine action, in countries where these efforts will have the greatest humanitarian impact.

For example in FY 12, the Department of State began providing assistance for clearance activities in Zimbabwe.  There is heavy mine contamination in Zimbabwe and there have been over 1,500 human casualties and over 120,000 accidents with livestock.  Humanitarian demining activities will reduce the likelihood of such accidents.

Specific factors used to determine whether to provide assistance to a country include:  the amount and location of the landmines/unexploded ordnance (UXO); the capacity of the host nation; and whether the security and political situation is favorable to carrying out demining and UXO removal.

LIA: As a follow-up, what criteria does the Department use to determine whether or not to continue funding programs in countries where support has been given?

DAS Givhan: The Department of State uses the same criteria to determine whether or not to continue funding a program as it does on whether or not to establish a program.

LIA. Are there any countries the Department wanted to support humanitarian mine action programs in, but did not and why?

DAS Givhan: Yes, in FY 2012 there were two:

  • The Department had planned to provide Humanitarian Mine Action assistance to Guinea-Bissau.  However, given the April 12, 2012 coup, the United States was obliged to terminate foreign assistance to the Government of Guinea-Bissau consistent with the requirements of section 7008 of the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 2012.
  • The Department also suspended its support for programs in Sudan when the government of Sudan asked all of the humanitarian demining NGOs to leave the country and seized their equipment.  In addition, political unrest has led to significant personnel reductions at U.S. Embassy Khartoum, which compromises our ability to monitor demining programs in country.

LIA: The Bureau of Political-Military [PM] Affairs primarily funds mine clearance and mine risk education programs and victim assistance programming and funding is mostly left to USAID’s Leahy War Victims’ Fund; do you believe there is a role for PM to support victim assistance and how would PM fulfill that role?

DAS Givhan: The State Department does fund survivor assistance programs when they are complementary to our mine action programs and are not duplicative of work being undertaken by USAID.  In these cases, we coordinate with our colleagues at USAID to ensure the best use of funding.   Any assistance programs managed by USAID and the Department of State do not differentiate victims by the munition that caused their injury.

Although we did not provide survivor assistance in Africa in FY 2011, we did provide funding for survivor assistance in Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Peru, Vietnam, and Yemen.  PM/WRA funding for survivor assistance generally includes rehabilitation and vocational services.

LIA: With the budget fights on Capitol Hill, how will PM preserve the funding for humanitarian mine action?

DAS Givhan: The Department of State’s Conventional Weapons Destruction programs receive widespread bipartisan support from Congress.  We appreciate this support and will continue to make the case to Congress that these programs are effective and in the nation’s interest.

LIA: The Convention on Conventional Weapons framework has recently considered Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines (meaning anti-vehicle mines) and cluster munitions; where do you think these negotiations will go?

DAS Givhan: The United States has been a leader in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) efforts on Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM).  The United States was among the original co-sponsors of a proposed additional protocol to address the indiscriminate use of MOTAPM in the years leading up to the Third Review Conference of the CCW in 2006.  We were frustrated that the CCW was forced to suspend this work because of the inability of states to reach consensus at that Conference.

We have been supportive of the decision to resume work with an expert-level meeting and actively participated in the discussion at this meeting in April.  We fully recognize the humanitarian threat associated with the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of MOTAPM and believe that there is room for specific restrictions on the use of MOTAPM in addition to the relevant provisions of CCW Amended Protocol II (Mines, Booby Traps, and other Explosive Devices).  We look forward to further discussing this issue at the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties in November.

The United States was deeply disappointed by the failure of the Fourth Review Conference of the CCW to conclude a protocol on cluster munitions.  The protocol would have prohibited a greater number of cluster munitions for the United States alone than the Oslo Convention has prohibited for all of its member states combined. There are no further negotiations scheduled at this time.  The CCW States Parties could decide to restart negotiations in the future, but that seems unlikely anytime soon.  

LIA: The Administration initiated a review of the 2004 US Landmine Policy; what is the status of that review and do you foresee any significant changes on the horizon?

DAS Givhan: We have not made a decision on U.S. accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel landmines (Ottawa Convention).

The operational issues raised by accession require careful consideration, and this work is ongoing.

The United States shares the humanitarian concern of parties to the Ottawa Convention and sent an observer delegation to the 11th Meeting of States Parties to the Ottawa Convention, November 28-December 2, 2011, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

We continue to demonstrate our commitment to addressing the potential humanitarian consequences caused by landmines:

  • The United States is the world’s single largest financial supporter of humanitarian mine action, and since 1993 (through October 2012) has provided over $2 billion in aid in over 90 countries for conventional weapons destruction programs, including clearance of landmines and unexploded munitions.
  • The United States has ended use of all non-detectable mines, both anti-personnel, as well as anti-vehicle mines, which are not covered by the Ottawa Convention.
  • The United States ended all use of persistent mines, both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, at the end of 2010.  These are the mines that can remain active years or even decades after a conflict ends.

In addition, the United States has ratified the Amended Mines Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), a separate international treaty that establishes transparent and verifiable standards for the use of landmines to minimize risks to civilians.

LIA: Mine clearance activities funded by the State Department rely on tried and true techniques such as manual clearance, mechanical clearance and mine detection dogs; are there any new or emerging techniques, e.g., rats, acoustics, chemical films, that you find intriguing and why?

DAS Givhan: The State Department is generally not involved in Research and Development for humanitarian mine clearance techniques.  We refer you to the U.S. Department of Defense’s Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (HD R&D) Program which focuses on developing technologies to improve the efficiency and safety of removing post-conflict landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).  HD R&D designs, builds, demonstrates, and evaluates prototype mine-and UXO-clearing technologies for indigenous, host-nation-conducted demining operations supported by the U.S. Department of Defense.

LIA: Will the US be represented at December’s Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and if so, what will your goals for attendance be; if not, will the US participate in the next Review Conference?

DAS Givhan: The United States has attended the Ottawa Convention annual meetings since the 2009 Cartagena Review Conference.  This has been a useful opportunity to meet with representatives from other states and non-governmental organizations to discuss and coordinate our common humanitarian mine action efforts.

No formal decision has been made regarding attendance this year.  (As of 11/15/12, no decision had been made).

LIA: [Regarding] question 5, I did not specifically ask about the Ottawa Treaty.  I am glad to hear that the US Government is reviewing what the consequences of accession to the Ottawa Treaty would be and is committed to addressing the potential humanitarian consequences of anti-personnel landmines, but I would also like to know more about the review of the US Government’s 2004 Landmine Policy.  Does your response mean that the central question of the review was whether or not the US Government should accede to the Ottawa Treaty?  Or did the review have another central question at its core?  Also, do you know when a decision on accession to the Ottawa Treaty might be made, since consideration on that question is ongoing?

[Question truncated by the State Department to: “Regarding the 2004 Landmine Policy Review, was the central question of the review whether or not the United States should accede to the Ottawa Treaty, or did the review have another central question at its core?  What is the timeline for the current Landmine Policy Review?”]

DAS Givhan: While I’m obviously not in a position to speak to the internal deliberations of previous administrations, this statement from Lincoln Bloomfield, the Assistant Secretary of Political-Military Affairs at the time of the 2004 Landmine Policy announcement summarizes their vision.

We are mindful of the humanitarian consequences of indiscriminate landmine use.  Indeed, the United States remains the world’s largest donor to humanitarian mine action.

The operational issues raised by the review require careful consideration, and this work is ongoing.

LIA: What will success look like for the US’s Convention Weapons Destruction Program?

DAS Givhan: Substantial assistance from the United States and other donors over the last 20 years has significantly reduced casualties from landmine and unexploded munitions.  While our vision of success is to continue this trend, explosions from munitions depots are of growing concern.  Our experience has shown us that overlap often exists between explosive remnants of war (ERW), at-risk small arms and light weapons, including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), and excess, unsecured or unstable conventional munitions.

To more effectively confront these overlapping threats to human and national security, our programs and funding have merged under an umbrella known as Conventional Weapons Destruction.  Our consolidated CWD budget increases flexibility by allowing program implementers the ability to address multiple threats simultaneously for greater efficiency and impact.

Increasingly, our efforts have focused on destroying unstable munitions before they explode and helping states to improve management of their stockpiles to prevent such tragic humanitarian disasters, as well as cleaning up depot explosions when they do occur.  Unfortunately, due to the enormous challenge before us, efforts to mitigate ERW and munitions depot explosions will continue to be a long-term effort.

Michael P. Moore, November 19, 2012


The M18A1 Claymore Mine – A “Persistent” Mine

The United States government published its current landmine policy in 2004.  Some of the key items in the policy include plans to “eliminate all persistent landmines from its arsenal,” “not use any persistent landmines — neither anti-personnel nor anti-vehicle — anywhere after 2010,” and “develop non-persistent (self-destructing/self-deactivating) landmines” (State Department).  The US issued this policy in lieu of signing the Mine Ban Treaty and while the landmine policy is under review by the Obama Administration, the speed of that review and recent procurements suggest that there will be no immediate changes.  Instead, the US Army, while developing the Spider Networked Munition System (see previous post), is also buying a lot of newly-made M18A1 “Claymore” anti-personnel mines, mines that do not have self-destructing or self-deactivating features in the current model.

On February 14, 2011, the US Army issued a Request for Proposals for companies to make up to 255,000 M18A1 Claymore mines for delivery to the Army through April 30, 2016 (FedBizOpps, Solicitation # W52P1J09R0088).  The total value of the contract, ultimately issued to Spectra Technologies, LLC of Camden, Arkansas on June 23, 2011, is up to $100 million over five years (FedBizOpps, Award # W52P1J11D0077). The problem with Claymore mines is the fact that they may violate the Mine Ban Treaty and the intent of the US landmine policy is to put the United States in compliance with most of the Mine Ban Treaty’s provisions without actually acceding to the treaty.

The size, shape and usage of Claymore mines are very distinctive.  Claymores are directional, fragmentation mines that use a small amount of explosive to propel 400 to 700 steel balls across a 60 degree arc and an “effective” range of 50 meters.  US models have the words “Front, Toward Enemy” helpfully stenciled on one side so you know which way the steel balls will go.  Claymores are meant to be used against people, not vehicles and referred to by the Army and others as “anti-personnel mines” (Military.com; FedBizOpps, Solicitation # W52P1J-09-R-0088; FAS).  Because of the effectiveness of Claymore mines as anti-personnel devices, many armies, including the Chinese, Russian and Swiss, have produced their own variations. 

M18A1 Claymore Mine, Photo Courtesy of WikiMedia

Claymore mines historically have had two modes: a command-activated mode and a victim-activated mode.  In the command-activated mode, the soldier who has set up the mine will activate the mine using an electric detonator switch.  In the victim-activated mode, the mine is set up with a trip-wire that activates the mine when the trip wire is broken.  Not being a government contractor, I could not access the most recent Technical Data Packages for Claymore mine specifications (as part of solicitation # W52P1J-09-R-0088), but the basics of the weapon remain the same in the solicitation descriptions.  The most recent description from the US Army office responsible for munitions describes Claymores as “detonated using an electric or non-electric initiation system and is used to deter enemy pursuit, establish perimeter defenses and conduct ambushes” (PMCSS).  In the absence of an explicit mention that Claymores can no longer be activated via tripwires, I am willing to assume that tripwire-activation remains a possibility.

It’s the victim-activated, trip-wire function that makes the Claymore mines controversial.  According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Claymore mines that are used solely in the command-activated mode are permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty.  In 2003, only Sweden – among all States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, twenty of whom had reported stockpiling Claymores – had taken steps to modify its stock of Claymore mines to ensure they only operated in a command-activated mode (ICBL, pdf).  By 2007, thirty States Parties had reported stockpiling Claymores, but only six – Belarus, Denmark, Lithuania, Moldova, New Zealand and Sweden – had modified their mines to prevent victim activation.  These States Parties chose “to physically modify the mine to accept only electric detonation and some have physically removed and destroyed the tripwire assembly and appropriate blasting cap.”  Some states, including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Germany simply destroyed all of their Claymore stockpiles rather than make the Treaty-mandated modifications (ICBL, Word Document; ICBL). In 2010, ICBL reminded the States Parties in attendance of the Intersessional Meetings in Geneva “to report on the destruction of sensitive fuzes and on steps taken to ensure that Claymore… Mines can only be used in Command-Detonated mode” (ICBL, pdf).

The United States granted an exemption for command-activated Claymore mines in the export ban on landmines in 1992, however, the statements by ICBL and the fact that the model number for Claymores has not changed in many years, suggests that the M18A1 Claymore retains its victim-activated properties. Until the Claymore is completed eliminated or substantially modified to remove the “non-electric initiation system,” a fantastic euphemism for “trip-wire,” then the US can never be fully compliant with its own policies and has just ordered another quarter-million violations. 

Michael P. Moore, January 18, 2012

 

UPDATE, February 14, 2012:

Update to posting on Claymore Mines, courtesy of Mark Hiznay, Human Rights Watch:

 

“The description from the Sources Sought notification, which is part of the solicitation [Landmines in Africa] cites:

‘The M18A1 consists of the M18A1 Anti Personnel Weapon Body and a non-electrical initiation system packed for field use in an M7 Bandoleer. The M18A1 Anti Personnel Weapon Body consists of a molded plastic case which is lined with a single layer of 700 steel balls in a resin matrix along the inside of the convex side. The remainder of the case is filled with Composition C4 high explosive. Two folding scissor-type steel legs are affixed to the bottom edge. Molded along the top edge are an aiming site and two cap wells that accept plastic combination shipping plug / blasting cap holders. The non-electric initiation system is composed of approximately 100 ft shock-tube, Blasting cap and In-line initiation system.’

Seems [Landmines in Africa] did not understand the significant of the last sentence (Ed. Note: Mr. Hiznay is absolutely correct, I did not). What is “shock tube”, or more specifically a “shock tube detonator”?

[Mr. Hiznay lets] Wikipedia explain:

‘Shock tube detonator is a non-electric explosive fuze or initiator in the form of small-diameter hollow plastic tubing used to transport an initiating signal to an explosive charge by means of a percussive wave traveling the length of the tube.’

When did the transition for Claymore initiation in the US?

Look no further than the Landmine Monitor Report 2005:

‘In February 2004, the Pentagon requested $20.2 million to produce 40,000 M18A1E1 Claymore mines. Mohawk Electrical Systems, Inc, in Milford, Delaware is scheduled to produce the munitions between June 2005 and March 2006. The M18A1E1 will incorporate a new triggering system that does not rely on either the victim-activated mechanical tripwire fuze or the command-detonated electrical initiation provided with the M18A1. Instead, the Claymores will be command detonated by a new generation of modernized initiators that use explosives to trigger the mine.’

The M18A1E1 is the developmental designator for the modified M18A1, in practices it’s the same munition. Bottom line: there is no conspiracy in the term “non-electrical initiation system” – it’s a pyrotechnic system now, still command detonated.

Additionally, a member of the US military would be violating US policy and DoD Directive, and thus subject to sanction, if they use a Claymore with a tripwire, which is recognized by the Bush Policy [the 2004 US Landmine Policy] as an antipersonnel mine. Remember, the use of Claymores with tripwires authorized was only valid until 2010 and only in Korea.”

Thank you, Mark, for the clarification and explanation.  If you ever have any additional comments on what you see here, feel free to post.

 

Michael P. Moore, February 14, 2012.